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ABSTRACT
As the application of deep learning continues to grow, so
does the amount of data used to make predictions. While
traditionally, big-data deep learning was constrained by com-
pute performance and off-chip memory bandwidth, a new
constraint has emerged: privacy. One solution is homomor-
phic encryption (HE). Applying HE to the client-cloud model
allows cloud services to perform inference directly on the
client’s encrypted data. While HE can meet privacy con-
straints, it introduces enormous computational challenges
and remains impractically slow in current systems.
This paper introduces Cheetah, a set of algorithmic and
hardware optimizations for HE DNN inference to achieve
plaintext DNN inference speeds. Cheetah proposes HE-
parameter tuning optimization and operator scheduling opti-
mizations, which together deliver 79× speedup over state-of-
the-art. However, this still falls short of plaintext inference
speeds by almost four orders of magnitude. To bridge the
remaining performance gap, Cheetah further proposes an
accelerator architecture which, when combined with the al-
gorithmic optimizations, approaches plaintext DNN infer-
ence speeds. We evaluate several common neural network
models (e.g., ResNet50, VGG16, and AlexNet) and show
that plaintext-level HE inference for each is feasible with a
custom accelerator consuming 30W and 545mm2.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning lies at the heart of many modern services
and applications, and is one of the most widely used methods
to process personalized data. These models have become so
successful and computationally efficient that deep learning
is now integral to everyday life. However, as such services
become ever-intricately woven into our lives, there is growing
demand for privacy-preserving machine learning – a daunting
task that this paper seeks to address.
Several techniques exist that offer privacy for deep learn-
ing inference that trade off the degree of security delivered
versus computational efficiency. Generally, these techniques
Table 1: Generalization of privacy-preserving techniques.
Solution Security Limitation
Local System Edge performance; leaks model
TEE System Performance; side-channels
DP Statistical Applications; utility-privacy tradeoff
MPC Cryptographic Communication bandwidth
HE Cryptographic Compute
deliver security via system implementation or mathemati-
cal guarantees. Implementation-based methods include (i)
moving computation to edge devices, i.e., local computa-
tion [54, 68], and (ii) trusted execution environments (TEEs),
e.g., SGX [10, 15, 59]. Both methods achieve security by
monitoring and restricting data usage via a combination of
software and hardware implementations. In contrast, meth-
ods offering provable mathematical guarantees provide a
theoretically-quantifiable level of privacy. Such solutions
include (i) differential privacy (DP) [4, 13, 18, 21], (ii) se-
cure multi-party compute (MPC) [32, 36, 48, 49], and (iii)
homomorphic encryption (HE) [7, 28, 31, 53]. Table 1 sum-
marizes the techniques and limitations associated with each
with respect to wide-scale deployment.
Each of the above solutions have differing limitations. Lo-
cal execution offers individual users improved security, but
there is risk of sensitive information leaking or being stolen
through the model, plus model-privacy concerns for service
providers [60]. TEEs have been shown to be vulnerable to
side-channel attacks [15]. DP offers statistical privacy levels
quantified via privacy loss ε but imposes an abstruse trade-off
between ε and data utility [20]. Moreover, while DP has seen
success in training [12, 45], its application to inference is an
open question. MPC also delivers cryptographically-strong
privacy guarantees. However, MPC performance is limited
by communication bottlenecks [36, 40, 49], which require
consideration of network-protocol and technology levels, or
reformulating the algorithm itself to alleviate.
This paper focuses on homomorphic encryption (HE) to en-
able privacy-preserving deep learning inference, or HE infer-
ence. The key strength of HE is that it offers cryptographically-
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Figure 1: The Cheetah framework and system design. Speedup achieved for ResNet50 is reported in red.
strong privacy guarantees, but these guarantees come at the
cost of massive computational overheads. These overheads
are so high that existing state-of-the-art implementations of
HE inference [28, 31, 53] are still five to six orders of mag-
nitude slower than plaintext inference. To put this in per-
spective, the current state-of-the-art HE inference solution
(Gazelle [32]) takes 800ms for a single MNIST inference.
These computational overheads are so extreme that prior re-
search has yet to consider modern datasets and models, e.g.,
ImageNet and ResNet50, as even MNIST is currently beyond
the realm of feasibility. In this paper, we propose a three-
part algorithm-hardware co-design to demonstrate that the six
order-of-magnitude performance gap in the state-of-the-art
can be overcome.
High-performance HE inference requires addressing three
key challenges. First, at the algorithmic level, HE has config-
urable parameters that trade performance (i.e., HE operator
latency) and “computational budget,” canonically know as
the noise budget in HE literature. This HE noise budget limits
the amount of computation (i.e., number of HE operations)
that can be applied to encrypted data while still allowing
correct decryption. Aggressive HE parameter setting im-
proves performance by reducing the cost of each operation
(e.g., using smaller data types), but if set too aggressively,
the noise budget can be exceeded and cause the computa-
tion (i.e., decryption) to fail. The second challenge is how
computations are scheduled and mapping to HE primitives.
HE only supports a limited set of operators (e.g., add and
multiply) that applications must be expressed as, and each
operator increases noise differently. Therefore, noise-aware
operator schedules can significantly improve performance
by reducing accumulated noise, enabling more aggressive
HE parameters to be used. The final challenge is the sheer
number of computations HE inference entails. As we show,
this challenge requires hardware acceleration and leveraging
the extreme degrees of parallelism in both DNNs and HE
operators to maximize performance.
Key Contributions: To address these challenges, this paper
presents Cheetah, a framework (Figure 1) to enable practi-
cal HE-based privacy-preserving machine learning inference
by combining algorithm optimization and custom hardware
acceleration. We assume Gazelle [32] as our state-of-the-art
baseline. Our contributions are as follows:
First, we propose HE-PTune (Section 4), which is an
analytical model that tunes HE parameters at the algo-
rithm level. HE-PTune automatically identifies the highest-
performance HE parameter settings that satisfy noise-budget
constraints by tuning HE parameters based on the needs of
each layer in a deep neural network model. HE-PTune’s pa-
rameter tuning yields up to 11.7× for VGG16 and 5.5× for
ResNet50 performance benefit over state-of-the-art.
Second, we propose a new schedule for dot product op-
erations called Sched-PA to minimize consumption of the
noise budget and improve performance in HE. Sched-PA
is a partial-aligned dot product schedule, which exploits the
key insight that the order of HE operations significantly im-
pacts performance and noise budget. This allows Sched-PA
to achieve a maximum additional speedup of 10.2× (5.20×
harmonic mean) and a combined speed using HE-PTune of
79.6× (13.5× harmonic mean) over state-of-the-art.
Third, we propose a custom hardware accelerator ar-
chitecture that combines these algorithmic optimizations
to approach plaintext speeds for privacy-preserving HE
inference given the abundance of parallelism and opportu-
nities for specialization. To do this, we first conduct hot
kernel profiling of an HE software implementation [55] to
derive the speedups necessary to achieve plaintext inference
speeds using parameters identified by HE-PTune and Sched-
PA. We also identify the amount of application inter-kernel
and intra-kernel parallelism available in hot kernels. We then
use these profiling results to implement a custom accelerator
architecture for HE inference and conduct design space ex-
ploration for each HE kernel to measure speedups afforded
by exploiting exposed parallelism.
By combining algorithmic optimizations with large-scale
custom hardware acceleration, Cheetah approaches speeds
comparable to plaintext deep learning inference. Com-
pared to Gazelle, our system is five to six orders of magnitude
faster. For ResNet50, we find accelerator hardware require-
ments on the order of 545mm2 and 30W in a 5nm technology
node (Section 7). More importantly, we find that the ac-
celerator area and power resources required to support HE
inference at these speeds is within practical (albeit still high)
resource requirements which is still on the order of a large
datacenter-class GPU or similar coprocessor.
2. OVERVIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 System Setup
A typical deep learning system setup is shown in the gray
box of Figure 1. A client generates data and sends it to the
cloud. The cloud performs inference and the result is returned
to the client. The most direct way to apply HE is for the client
to encrypt the data, the cloud processes the entire inference
using HE, and the encrypted result is returned to the client.
Unfortunately, this approach has two drawbacks: (1) HE
cannot readily process nonlinear functions (without incurring
prohibitively large penalties) and (2) many computations in
DNNs requires a relatively large HE noise budget, which
necessitates larger encryption parameters, resulting in poor
performance. This effect is exacerbated by deeper networks.
A recently proposed system, called Gazelle [32], shows
how multi-party computation (MPC) can resolve the afore-
mentioned nonlinear and HE noise budget challenges. The
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Figure 2: Overview of how data is processed using BFV homomorphic encryption.
main performance improvement of Gazelle over HE-only
solutions comes from the observation that widely used activa-
tion functions in deep learning such as ReLU or MaxPool can
be represented efficiently using Boolean circuitry, securely
computed using Yao’s garbled circuits (GC) that incur small
computational overhead [5, 66].
In Gazelle, the client encrypts data to be processed and
sends it to the cloud. The cloud applies a single linear layer
(e.g., convolution) to the input using HE. ReLU and pooling
functions are computed on the client using a GC. The GC is
configured by the cloud and sent to the client along with the
encrypted linear layer outputs. The client then decrypts the
outputs and processes them using the GC. Note that allowing
the client to observe the original outputs after decryption can
leak the cloud’s private model weights (knowing the inputs
and outputs of a linear function would make it trivial to steal
the cloud’s model). To prevent this, the cloud obscures the
actual activation values (both input and output) by adding
random numbers to each, i.e., the client receives encrypted
activation input also obfuscated with random numbers. After
decryption, the client runs the GC, which includes a subtrac-
tion circuit to remove the added random numbers securely
(recovering original values), an activation unit (ReLU or pool-
ing), and finally and addition to obscure the plaintext output
value and protect model weights. Once GC evaluation com-
pletes, the masked output is re-encrypted by the client and
sent to the cloud. On the cloud, the random numbers added
to the activation are removed via HE subtraction and the fol-
lowing linear layer is computed (using HE). The HE-MPC
cycle repeats for each layer of the deep network.
Note that in homomorphic encryption, decryption resets
the HE noise budget. Therefore, the Gazelle system ad-
dresses both issues associated with nonlinear computation
and limitations of HE noise budget. However, the compu-
tational overheads of HE—the focus of this paper—remain
prohibitive. Gazelle is an instance of a more general class of
privacy-preserving solutions combining multiple techniques
(e.g., [36, 38, 40, 44, 52]). Cheetah addresses the HE com-
pute bottleneck, which is an architecture/hardware problem,
but the proposed optimizations for HE are more generally
applicable to other solutions beyond Gazelle. Solving the
communication/network bottleneck is beyond the scope of
this paper. We expect contributions on the algorithmic (e.g.,
different MPC protocols [23, 41, 44]) and technology (e.g.,
5G) front to help.
2.2 Threat Model
The threat model assumed by Cheetah is the same as in
Gazelle [32], and similar to other two-party compute (2PC)
solutions including DeepSecure [49], MiniONN [36], and
SecureML [40]. This model assumes the client/user and
cloud are honest but curious, i.e., each agent follows the
Table 2: BFV parameters.
Parameter Description
n Polynomial degree (vector length)
t Plaintext (pt) modulus
q Ciphertext (ct) modulus
Wdcmp Weight (pt) decomposition base
Adcmp Activation (ct) decomposition base
σ2 Variance of noise added for encryption (fixed)
protocol precisely but may try to infer information. Under this
assumption, Cheetah optimizes the protocol preserving the
privacy of both the clients’ data and cloud’s model weights.
For more details, see [32].
Note that the protocol does leak some information about
the model. Because ReLU and pooling layers are performed
by the client, the client can learn the number and shape of
each layer. The model weights values, however, are not
leaked. It is possible to obscure this information (e.g., pad
tensor dimensions and add null layers), but they are not con-
sidered here and left as future work. Cheetah focuses on
improving users privacy while protecting the cloud’s models
(considered IP today [67]) from model-stealing attacks [60].
3. BACKGROUND
This section provides a brief introduction to HE and the
BFV [22] construction used by Cheetah. For a complete
technical description see [8, 22].
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption: The Basics
HE is a privacy-preserving encryption technique that en-
ables computation over encrypted data, which was first shown
to be possible by Gentry [24]. Since its discovery, many
algorithmic improvements have been made to improve per-
formance [6, 8, 9, 22, 25, 26, 27]. Modern HE schemes such
as BFV allow adds and multiplies between encrypted data
and derive security from the hardness of the Ring Learning
With Error (RLWE) problem [37]. In BFV, noise is added
during plaintext encryption and accumulates over successive
ciphertext computations. If the aggregate noise exceeds a
noise budget threshold, decryption fails. This noise budget
is a function of the HE parameters and defines how many
computations can occur before decryption fails. HE schemes
of this type are called Leveled HE (LHE). In contrast, fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes enable an arbitrary
number of computations. FHE schemes can be built from
LHE schemes via bootstrapping [22, 24]. Bootstrapping re-
duces the noise in the ciphertext but is expensive to imple-
ment, so most applications focus on LHE.
3.2 BFV: Relatively Efficient HE
BFV [22] is a relatively efficient LHE scheme; Figure 2
shows an overview of the process. In BFV, data is encoded
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Table 3: Impact on Noise of basic BFV operations.
Noise Bound after Each Operation
Noise (v0) in fresh ct0 2nB2 (B = 6σ)
HE_Add(ct0,ct1) v0 + v1 (additive)
HE_Mult(pt,ct0) nlptWdcmpv0/2 (multiplicative)
HE_Rotate(ct0) v0 + lct AdcmpBn/2 (additive)
as a plaintext polynomial that is then encrypted as a pair of
ciphertext polynomials. Ciphertexts are then input to addition
and multiplication during evaluation. The resulting cipher-
texts from evaluation are decrypted to plaintext and finally
decoded to individual scalars. Polynomials are implemented
as integer vectors, where the vector length (polynomial de-
gree) and bit-width (coefficient size) are set by HE parameters.
BFV parameters (listed in Table 2) must be carefully tuned
as they affect computational efficiency and security.
Core BFV Parameters (n, t, q): Plaintext polynomials are
elements of the ring: Rt = Zt [x]/(xn+1), where the degree
of the polynomial is less than n (a power of 2). Polynomial
coefficients are integers in Zt (integers in the range (− t2 , t2 ]).
t is called the plaintext modulus as all HE operations are taken
modulo t in the plaintext space. Setting t requires profiling the
application to ensure enough bits are used for correctness and
no more, as over provisioning causes unnecessary slowdown.
Similarly, two polynomials of a ciphertext are in Rq =
Zq[x]/(xn+1), where q is the ciphertext modulus. The ratio
between q and t determines the noise budget, which sets the
number of HE operators that can be computed per ciphertext
before decryption fails. The ratio between n and q for a given
variance (σ2) of Gaussian noise added for encryption sets the
security strength of the HE scheme (see [22] for details).
Encoding (Packing) Data to Polynomial: When proper HE
parameters are used (i.e., t is prime and t ≡ 1 mod 2n), a
property of the ring Rt enables a form of algorithmic paral-
lelism. Here, each plaintext polynomial in Rt and, hence, the
ciphertext, can be packed with n data. This means that each
HE addition or multiplication can actually perform an n-way
parallel element-wise computation. With packing, each scalar
data is tied to a slot, and slots can be thought of as individual
elements in the integer array. Packing significantly improves
HE performance; n is typically on the order of thousands and
the benefits of packing are proportional [58].
Polynomial Representations: Polynomials are represented
in two spaces—coefficient and evaluation. The coefficient
representation is how polynomials are typically represented,
e.g., ∑n−1i=0 αix
i. The evaluation space is analogous to the
frequency domain of time-domain signals. Similar to FFT,
efficient conversion between the two is done via the Number
Theoretic Transform (NTT) [9,58]. Cheetah keeps polynomi-
als in the evaluation space and converts to coefficient space
only as needed for operations like decomposition (see below).
Using the evaluation space as a default representation reduces
the number of NTTs needed for homomorphic CNN/FC. Note
that applying NTT to ciphertexts does not affect noise.
3.2.1 Operations of BFV
BFV consists of three operators: HE_Add, HE_Mult, and
HE_Rotate. Recall that the HE_Add and HE_Mult oper-
ate on vectors of packed data, so they are effectively SIMD-
add and SIMD-multiply operations. Note that the underlying
implementations of HE_Add and HE_Mult consist of many
Table 4: HE-PTune performance models.
CNN HE_Mult HE_Rotate
n≥ w2 lpt cico f 2w/cn cico f 2w/cn
n < w2 lpt(2cn−1)cico f 2w (2cn−1)cico( f 2w−1)
FC HE_Mult HE_Rotate
n≥ ni,n≥ no lpt nino/n nino/n−1+ log(n/no)
n≥ ni,n < no lpt nino/n (ni−1)no/n
n < ni,n≥ no lpt nino/n (no + log(n/no))ni/n
n < ni,n < no lpt nino/n (n−1)nino/n2
modular arithmetic calculations, different from a single cy-
cle integer add or multiply computation. Table 3 shows the
amount of noise introduced by each operator which depend
on BFV parameters. B is the bound of the noise added dur-
ing encryption while vi represents the noise in ciphertext cti.
The remaining parameters (lpt , lct , Wdcmp, and Adcmp) are for
decomposition, defined in Section 3.2.2.
HE_Add: Two ciphertexts can be added homomorphically
by summing each ciphertext coefficient followed by a modulo
operation. I.e., a resulting coefficient outside the range Zq is
reduced to be in Zq. Reduction is implemented as a compar-
ison and subtraction to keep the performance overhead low.
Each HE_Add operation increases noise additively.
HE_Mult: BFV supports both ct-ct and pt-ct multipli-
cation. Cheetah uses pt-ct multiplication to multiply plain-
text weights by encrypted activations. Pt-ct multiplication is
achieved by multiplying evaluation space ciphertext polyno-
mials by the evaluation space plaintext polynomial containing
weights on a per-element basis. Performance is limited by the
modular reduction required for each polynomial coefficient of
output. Cheetah uses Barret reduction (details in Section 4.1).
HE_Mult operations increase noise by a multiplicative fac-
tor.
HE_Rotate: BFV supports slot rotation within a packed
polynomial to enable computation between data in different
slots. Since HE_Add and HE_Mult are element-wise opera-
tions, computations like dot products require HE_Rotate to
align partial products and implement the reduction (see Sec-
tion 5.1). HE_Rotate is computationally expensive with
many steps, and increases noise additively. We refer the
reader to [9, 62] for details.
3.2.2 Polynomial Decomposition
Decomposition is used to segment polynomials into mul-
tiple components with smaller-valued coefficients. The key
idea is that HE operations over smaller coefficient polynomi-
als reduces noise growth. To enable this, Cheetah has two
parameters for polynomial decomposition: Wdcmp and Adcmp
(Table 2), which defines the base that polynomials are de-
composed to. Decreasing decomposition base increases the
number of decomposed polynomials which decreases opera-
tor noise growth but increases the total amount of compute.
Once decomposed operators complete, resulting segments
are re-combined (i.e., summed) to get the final result.
HE_Rotate requires ciphertext decomposition, other-
wise a single operation can exceed the noise budget. The
decomposition base Adcmp is used to factor ciphertext poly-
nomials into multiple, smaller-magnitude polynomials when
HE_Rotate is applied. We denote lct ≈ logAdcmp(q) as the
number of polynomials with base Adcmp resulting from the de-
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Table 5: Noise models for CNN and FC layer.
CNN Output Noise
n≥ w2 f 2wciηMv0 +ηAci( f 2w−1+(cn−1)/cn)
n < w2 (2 fw−1) fwciηMv0 +ηAci(2 fw +1)( fw−1)
FC Output Noise
n≥ ni niηMv0 +ηA(ni−1)
n < ni niηMv0 +ηAni(n−1)/n
composition. Since HE_Rotate noise increase is additive,
with decomposition noise increase by an additive factor pro-
portional to Adcmp and the increase in number of polynomial
operations lct .
HE_Mult also benefits from decomposition to reduce
noise. For neural networks, we use HE_Mult with decompo-
sition to compute the partial products since weights are pre-
sented in plaintext. Using a decomposition base Wdcmp, the
plaintext polynomial can be decomposed into lpt ≈ logWdcmp(t)
polynomials. The resulting HE_Mult with decomposition
requires lpt polynomial multiplications to implement but re-
duces noise growth by a factor of around t/(lptWdcmp).
4. HE-PTUNE: MODELS & PARAMETER
TUNING
Parameter selection is a major source of complexity in
HE (i.e., n, t,q,Wdcmp, Adcmp). The key challenge is strik-
ing a balance between noise budget and performance. A
higher noise budget enables greater computational depth per
ciphertext but slower HE operators. Existing solutions rely
on over-provisioning noise budgets, resulting in suboptimal
performance. This section proposes HE-PTune: analytical
performance and noise models for deep learning operators
in HE to maximize performance via fine-grained parameter
tuning. An evaluation of Cheetah’s HE parameters found
using HE-PTune shows up to a 11.7× speed up over the
state-of-the-art.
4.1 Performance Modeling
HE-PTune’s performance model is based on analytically
deriving the total number of underlying integer-multiplication
operations that need to take place per layer. (Recall that the
HE operator HE_Mult consists of many underlying multipli-
cations.) Empirical studies show most HE operators resolve
to multiplication and ones that do not have run-times either
strongly correlated or dominated by those that do. There-
fore, a high-level model multiplication count is sufficient
to model performance (as validated below). Performance
models for CNN and FC layers are built by first modeling
HE and transformation (i.e., NTT) operations. Next, mod-
eled operations are reduced to the total number of underlying
integer-multiplication operations.
4.1.1 Modeling CNNs
CNN layers are parameterized as (w, fw,ci,co), where w2
and f 2w represent the size of input image and weight filter,
and ci and co denote the number of input and output chan-
nels, respectively. Encryption parameters follow the notation
defined in Table 2. Effective modeling of HE_Mult and
HE_Rotate counts require consideration of two cases: 1)
the ciphertext slot count is greater than an input image (i.e.,
n ≥ w2), 2) the ciphertext slot count is less than an input
image (i.e., n < w2). Let cn denote the number of input im-
age channels per ciphertext (i.e., n/w2) in the first case and
inversely the number of ciphertexts per input image channel
(w2/n) in the second case. Both cases count the number of
HE operations per CNN layer (see Table 4).
HE_Rotate operations require both polynomial multi-
plication and NTTs. Precisely, assuming a ciphertext de-
composition base Adcmp, 2lct multiplications and lct +1 NTT
(lct ≈ logAdcmp q) are required per HE_Rotate. Each n-point
NTT entails n logn/2 butterflies. Cheetah uses Harvey’s but-
terfly (3 integer-multiplications per butterfly).
Note that HE_Mult does not require NTT as the evalu-
ation space is the default representation of polynomials in
Cheetah (details in Section 5). Each HE_Mult requires two
element-wise modular multiplications between the two poly-
nomials of BFV. In other words, 2n modular multiplication
are performed per HE_Mult. Cheetah uses Barrett reduc-
tion [33], which uses five integer-multiplications for reducing
products.
4.1.2 Modeling FCs
A similar process is repeated to model FC layers. The
only difference is the change in the number of HE_Mult and
HE_Rotate counts. The required number of integer multi-
plications per HE_Mult and HE_Rotate operations is the
same in both CNN and FC. Here, an FC layer is parameter-
ized as (ni,no), where ni and no represent the number of input
and output activations, respectively. The required number
of HE_Mult and HE_Rotate for all possible cases, condi-
tioned on the input-output ratio, are summarized in Table 4.
4.2 Noise Modeling
CNN and FC layers are implemented with HE operations
(see Section 5.1), so with an understanding of HE opera-
tor noise growth (see Table 3), we developed a model for
layer noise as a function of both HE (n, t,q,Wdcmp,Adcmp)
and FC/CNN ( fw,w,ci,co for CNN and ni,no for FC) param-
eters. If we directly used values from Table 3 the model
would estimate worst case noise, causing excessively slow
HE parameters to be used. Fortunately, the worst case is ex-
tremely rare. Here we develop practical-noise estimations for
HE operators and provide a theoretical analysis of the failure
rate. We also note that all prior work on high-performance
HE [11, 28, 32] set HE parameters using heuristics, proving
high-likelihoods for success but not guaranteeing it.
Cheetah builds a theoretically-motivated, empirically-driven
noise model that minimizes computational overheads with
a targeted probability of success. We use the fact that the
noise added for encryption is sampled from an independent
bounded discrete Gaussian (IBDG) distribution with vari-
ance σ2, and if Xi’s are IBDG with variance σ2i , then ∑iαiXi
is also IBDG with variance ∑iα2i σ2i . As the noise grows
multiplicatively in HE_Mult and additively in HE_Add
and HE_Rotate, we can compute the variance of the out-
put noise after each linear operation under independence
assumption (i.e., noise coefficients in ciphertexts are inde-
pendent), validated in [19]. Then, since the output noise, say
Y , is IBDG with standard deviation, say σY , the probabil-
ity of incorrect decryption is bound by Pr(|Y | ≥ q/(2t)) ≤
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Figure 3: Comparison of HE-PTune and Gazelle using AlexNet. Blue dots are HE configurations modeled by HE-PTune. The
red star is Gazelle’s configuration and the green star is the optimal found by HE-PTune. Layer5 and Layer0 show the best and
worst configuration for Gazelle with respect to utilized noise budget. HE-PTune’s speedup for all layers on the right.
2exp(−q2/(4t2σ2Y )). We use the above facts to derive an out-
put noise threshold given a probability of correct decryption.
Therefore, instead of using worst-case bounds and guaran-
teeing correct decryption, our noise model uses the scaled
expressions given in Table 3. The scaling factor c was chosen
for a decryption failure rate of less than 10−10, which is much
lower than the model’s misclassification rate. Empirically,
our experiment show c≈ 0.001 for the tested HE parameters
(e.g., n≥ 2048).
The output noise variance for CNN and FC layers are
tabulated in Table 5. Here, v0 is the initial noise for the
input ciphertext, ηM is the noise due to HE_Mult, and ηA is
the growth factor from HE_Rotate. By dividing q2t by the
output noise (and take the log), the remaining noise budget in
bits is given. When the budget is negative, computation fails;
when positive, it fails with probability ≤10−10.
4.3 HE Parameter Space Exploration
Using a single set of HE parameters for all DNN layers
results in unnecessarily poor performance. This is because
HE parameters must provision for the worse case noise across
different layers which may have different dimensions and
hyperparameters. Using HE-PTune’s models for noise and
performance, parameters can be tuned on a per-layer basis.
HE-PTune takes layer hyperparameters as input and outputs
optimal HE parameters found via a design space exploration.
Because the model is analytical, a vast (nearly exhaustive)
parameter space can be explored in a matter of minutes.
An example of HE parameter space exploration are given
in Figure 3 using the ImageNet dataset and AlexNet model.
Each blue dot is unique set of HE parameters modeled with
HE-PTune to estimate computation and remaining noise bud-
get. Red stars indicate parameters used by Gazelle and green
stars show the optimal point found using HE-PTune. Gazelle
uses the same sets of HE parameters for all layers. Of all
layers in the model, Layer 5 has the smallest remaining noise
budget, and it follows that the speedup between Gazelle and
Cheetah is the lowest for this layer (see bars in Figure 3).
Using HE-PTune, empirical results show using a single set of
parameters is inefficient and unnecessary. The highest Chee-
tah speedup is in Layer 0, where Gazelle has an excess noise
budget of 4.6 bits whereas HE-PTune finds a configuration
leaving only 1 bit of noise budget. Improvements come from
tailoring the parameters precisely for unique characteristics
of each layer; e.g., Layer 5 is FC and Layer 0 is CNN, the
computational demands between them vary by over 100×.
In addition to performance, HE-PTune eases the complex
task of identifying working HE parameter settings in the
first place. Recall that any point with a negative margin
fails decryption as the noise budget is exceeded. Of all the
points evaluated in the design space search, over 99% have
a negative remaining noise budget and will not work if used.
Finding HE parameters is difficult for non-experts, and further
motivating HE-PTune.
We validate the parameter sets from HE-PTune using dif-
ferent CNN and FC layers used across commonly used deep
learning models. We evaluate the following deep learning
models: LeNet-300-100 and LeNet5 for MNIST [35], and
AlexNet [34], VGG16 [57], and ResNet50 [30] for Ima-
geNet [51]. Each layer is tested using a variety of HE pa-
rameters, with no consideration of noise budget to explore
the parameter space. Execution times are collected by imple-
menting each CNN/FC layer in the SEAL HE library [55] and
measuring its performance using a Xeon server. The remain-
ing noise budget is collected after each run using SEAL’s
internal measuring capability and API. Overall, we find that
due to the randomness in the noise, the noise model shows
slightly larger error than the performance model. However,
this is acceptable as the worst-case errors are within 1 bit in
the low-remaining noise budget region of the space. This
implies the model is fast enough to tell whether a set of HE
parameters will allow correct computation of a given layer.
5. PARTIAL-ALIGNED SCHEDULING
This section introduces a new dot product schedule - Sched-
PA - to enable high-performance HE for the FC and CNN
layers. Recall that each HE primitive has different run-time
and additive noise trade-offs (Section 3) and the overheads of
different primitive schedules are not associative so order of
operations matters. Operation orderings with less noise are
beneficial as it enables higher-performance via more compu-
tationally efficient HE parameters. As a result, our Sched-PA
dot product schedule optimization provides a performance
benefit of up to 10.2× compared to Gazelle’s dot product
schedule which is prior state-of-the-art.
5.1 Sched-PA: Partial-Aligned Dot Products
The key challenge for implementing HE dot products is
optimizing how data is packed into polynomial slots and the
relative order of operations. Computing a dot product in
HE requires all three primitives: HE_Mult, HE_Add, and
HE_Rotate. First, each partial product is computed using
one full HE_Mult operation between a ciphertext (encrypted
activation) and a plaintext (model weights). Each partial is
then accumulated using a series of HE_Add operations to
reduce the final output. The problem is that HE operations
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only support computation between aligned polynomial slots.
This means that when polynomial A and B are multiplied
(resulting in C), C[i] = A[i]×B[i], ∀i ∈ [0,n). To properly
reduce each of the partials of a dot product, the slots in C
must be aligned to use the correct values.
Prior work aligns the input data before performing mul-
tiplication, referred to here as an input-aligned dot product
schedule (Sched-IA) [29, 32]. In input-aligned dot products,
the input ciphertext is first aligned, i.e., rotated, to the correct
output slot, and plaintext weights are packed appropriately.
(Recall that in the context of HE for deep learning in the
cloud the activations are assumed to be encrypted as cipher-
text and the weights in plaintext. Re-arranging plaintext data
in polynomials is cheap as there is no encryption or HE oper-
ations involved, weights must simply be arranged in a plain-
text vector.) The post-rotation ciphertext and plaintext are
then multiplied, resulting in a dot product partial (ciphertext).
Resulting partial ciphertexts can be readily accumulated to
compute the final value.
Cheetah proposes a new dot product implementation called
Sched-PA (see Figure 4, 5). The key insight of the implemen-
tation is that HE_Mult increases noise by a multiplicative
factor ηM (≤ nlptWdcmp/2) whereas HE_Rotate is additive
ηA. In partial-aligned dot products, the initial input cipher-
text is kept in its original order, never rotated. Weights are
again packed into a plaintext polynomial and aligned with
ciphertext slots to compute the correct partial product via
HE_Mult. Finally, resulting partial product ciphertexts are
aligned such that the partial slot matches the correct output
slot. Figure 5 also shows Sched-PA compared to the other
approach.
The benefit stems from noise accumulation in chained HE
operations. Recall that v0 and ηA represent the initial input ci-
phertext noise and additive noise from HE_Rotate, respec-
tively. Thus, a dot product using the partial aligned schedule
experiences a noise growth of ηMv0 +ηA. In contrast, the
Sched-IA dot product first rotates then multiplies, resulting
LeNet300100 LeNet5 Alexnet VGG16 Resnet50
Model
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ee
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p
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HE-PTune
HE-PTune + Sched-PA
Figure 6: Per-benchmark speedup achieved by Cheetah using
HE-PTune and Sched-PA. Speedup is relative to Gazelle [32].
in noise growth of ηM(v0+ηA), which is significantly larger
than the partial-aligned schedule. Saving noise enables HE-
PTune to identify higher performance HE parameter settings,
ultimately resulting in performance benefit.
5.2 Implementing Low-Noise Convolution
Figure 4 shows an example of how CNNs are implemented
in HE using Sched-PA. FC layers are implemented follow-
ing precisely the same steps as CNNs, as the core primitives
are also dot products. First, the input activation ciphertext
(Acts) is packed/encoded by placing adjacent pixels from
the client’s image sequentially in polynomial slots. This or-
dering eases partial ciphertext alignment. Next, CNN filter
weights (Filter) are packed/encoded into plaintext polynomi-
als. Each activation-weight polynomial is multiplied with
HE_Mult, resulting in a ciphertext of dot product partials.
The resulting partial polynomials are then rotated to align
partial slots to the proper output-neuron slot. Finally, with all
partials computed and aligned, the ciphertexts are summed
with HE_Add to perform partial reduction. Note how poly-
nomial slots allow multiple output neurons to be computed
in single ciphertext. This algorithmic parallelism provides
substantial performance and memory savings for HE as with-
out it, each thousand degree polynomial would only compute
a single output neuron, resulting in thousands of factors of
slowdown.
The zeros found in weight plaintext slots (e.g., PT0) en-
sure the correct computation of convolution operation. For
example, the red slot in Figure 4 shows how accumulation
works. After f0 is multiplied to D6 in the first HE_Mult, the
result is rotated right 6 times to be accumulated in the red
slot (C12 in the output). When this rotation is performed, D19
aligns to slot 0, however f0D19 should not be accumulated for
the convolution output of slot 0 (i.e., C0). Selectively adding
zeros in the plaintext slots avoids this boundary cases.
5.3 Evaluation Results
The effectiveness of Sched-PA is evaluated using five stan-
dard CNN models. HE-PTune is employed to maximize
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benefits using the same method from Section 4 where HE pa-
rameters are tuned on a per-layer basis. Multiple experiments
are run to show the benefits of HE-PTune with and without
Sched-PA relative to Gazelle [32].
The results for each model are shown in Figure 6. Overall,
the Cheetah optimizations substantially outperform Gazelle.
Using the harmonic mean, 2.98× speedup comes from HE-
PTune alone (5.25× ignoring MNIST). Sched-PA provides an
additional mean speedup of 5.20× (6.11× ignoring MNIST)
for a total mean performance improvement of 13.5× and max-
imum of 79.5× over Gazelle (30.3× mean without MNIST).
Significant performance overheads are incurred by Gazelle
as the high-noise, input-align schedule requires substantial
ciphertext and plaintext decomposition. Each time a polyno-
mial is decomposed to reduce operation noise, the number of
polynomials that must be computed grows proportionately.
In ResNet50, Cheetah’s optimizations result in a ciphertext
decomposition base of 8 to 16 more bits. A higher ciphertext
decomposition bases result in fewer decomposed polynomials
for HE_Rotate, and substantial performance improvements.
Using Sched-PA, Cheetah avoids all plaintext decomposition.
6. PROFILING HE INFERENCE
Algorithmic optimizations like HE-PTune and Sched-PA
significantly improve the performance over the state-of-the-
art [32], e.g., 55.6× for ResNet50. However, with algorithm
optimizations alone HE inference is still impractically slow -
3-4 orders of magnitude slower than plaintext inference. To
better understand performance limitations and bottlenecks,
we profile a high-performance software implementation of
HE inference and measure the speedups needed from hard-
ware acceleration.
We implement ResNet50 HE using the SEAL library [55].
Leveraging Cheetah to tune parameters and maximize perfor-
mance, a single inference takes 970 seconds running on an
Intel Xeon E5-2667 server. For reference, a single plaintext
inference implemented in Keras [14] running on the same
server takes 100 milliseconds. Since SEAL only supports
CPUs, we perform profiling on the CPU platform. Later we
also consider GPU optimization focusing on NTT kernel.
Profiling results are summarized in the pie chart of Fig-
ure 7. Notice that only a few kernels dominate performance
(HE_Mult, HE_Add, HE_Rotate, and NTT). HE_Rotate in
Figure 7 does not include NTT as this is shown separately. Of
the four, NTT is the primary bottleneck taking 55.2% (535
seconds) of the run time. The SEAL profile also contains a
long-tail of small functions as well (labeled as "Other" in Fig-
ure 7). A deeper investigation reveals that most of the time in
Figure 8: NTT GPU speedup over CPU.
"Other" functions is construction and destruction overhead.
Using the profile results, we compute the speedup needed
from each kernel to achieve plaintext HE inference. Figure 7
shows the results from this limit study of how various speedup
factors impact overall run time. The x-axis shows the speedup
factor applied to each labeled kernel function (note log scale);
the final speedup factor for each kernel is the speedup needed
(e.g., 16,384 for NTT). The y-axis shows absolute latency.
From left to right, the plot shows how the total inference
latency decreases as each theoretical speedup factor is applied
to each function. Kernel speedup is applied successively
where the run time from the most aggressive speedup factor is
taken as the base for the next function as well as the starting
point for the client. The horizontal red line is the 100ms
plaintext inference time taken as a latency target.
Speeding up HE with GPUs: One way to improve kernel
performance is with GPUs. For HE, GPUs provide large
improvements over CPUs but still fall short of the four orders
of magnitude compared to plaintext inference. To understand
the the limitations of HE on GPUs, we benchmark NTT,
which is the main HE bottleneck, using the cuHE library [16]
on an NVIDIA 1080-Ti GPU. We report GPU speedup for
different NTT transform batch sizes (1 to 1024) and vectors
lengths n = 16K, 32K, and 64K (Figure 8). We note that
some vector lengths are unnecessarily large for efficient BFV
implementations, but we included them to show the speedup
limits. For larger batch size, the speedup saturates at about
120× for batch sizes 512 and 1024. Profiling results using
nvprof for batch size 512 show that the GPU is highly utilized,
achieving 70% occupancy and 85% warp execution efficiency.
We also observe shared memory bank conflicts resulting in
only 43% of average shared memory efficiency.
Other first order limitations to performance likely derive
from (a) non-native, long integer data types requiring emula-
tion, (b) modular arithmetic, which adds branch instructions
and over 10 compute instructions per multiplication. De-
spite the speedups, GPUs fall well short of the improvements
required to reach native CPU speed. Finally, we note the
reported GPU speedup is optimistic as it ignores bit-reversal
(needed for HE inference), which we implement.
7. ACCELERATING HE INFERENCE
WITH CUSTOM HARDWARE
This section proposes a general accelerator architecture for
HE inference to bridge the remaining performance gap.
7.1 Accelerator Architecture
The proposed accelerator architecture is shown in Figure 9.
At a high level, it is composed of ciphertext (CT) processing
engines (PEs) that receive data from a PCIe-like streaming in-
terface and buffer intermediary results in SRAMs (Figure 9a).
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Hierarchically, PEs are composed of partial processing lanes
or Lanes, and a partial reduction network, which implement
the HE dot product (Figure 9b). Lanes are further decom-
posed into individual HE operators (Figure 9c).
7.1.1 PEs: Output Neuron Engines
Our architecture is designed to maximize performance
and parallelism by being output-stationary. Each PE pro-
cesses a single ciphertext of output neurons at a time and all
compute/memory resources necessary for the output remain
local to the PE; the number of PEs is an architecture parame-
ter. When there are more output neurons per layer (Parallel
Output CTs) than physical PEs, we time multiplex the compu-
tation across multiple PE executions. The PEs are connected
to input and output buffers used to route data to and from the
client. As the accelerator is output-stationary, these buffers
only handle communication, all state and intermediates are
local to PEs and, therefore, constitute small SRAMs.
The internals of the PE contain partial processing lanes
and partial reduction networks. Each PE contains an Input
CT buffer to store a copy of all activation CTs locally, a rel-
atively small SRAM for weights, a set of partial processing
lanes (hardware threads), a partial reduction network, and
output CT SRAM to interface with the controls to send the
results back to the client. Each Lane is capable of processing
a unique dot product partial; the number of lanes is param-
eterizable. Lanes within a PE operate in lockstep to enable
aggressive reuse of twiddle factor SRAMs required for NTTs.
The partial reduction network is configured based on the num-
ber of partials computed in parallel (i.e., number of Lanes).
Input CT SRAMs are provisioned with enough capacity to
hold all the inputs with sufficient bandwidth to feed all Lanes.
7.1.2 Lanes: Partial Engines
Each lane forms the backbone of the computation and is
composed of the individual HE operators. In Figure 9c, HE
kernel blocks are denoted in red, which we build in HLS.
Intermediary SRAMs, shown in blue, are used to store results
between HE kernels. We use SRAMs instead of off-chip
DRAM for intermediary results because of the high internal
bandwidth required within NTT modules to support aggres-
sive parallelism. Each NTT kernel at worst requires roughly
13 GB/s of combined internal read/write bandwidth; each
lane contains multiple NTTs and each PE contains many
lanes. Aside from the NTT kernels that require a butterfly
data access pattern, all operations within a Lane can be made
streaming (i.e, no SRAMs needed after kernels). This allows
the architecture to save SRAM resources. The NTT activa-
tion decomposition factor Adcmp introduces a parametrizable
degree of inter-NTT parallelism, which otherwise does not
impact overall latency. For high-performance, we allocate
the maximum number of lanes so that they can execute in
parallel for all partials.
Recall that in BFV each ciphertext is two polynomials.
The lane architecture shows the datapath and dependencies to
compute a single partial dot product. Both input polynomials
(CT[0] and CT[1]) are first multiplied by plaintext weights
using the HE_Mult operator outputting partial polynomials.
However, the datapaths diverge due as the BFV formula-
tion splits the compute asymmetrically between partial[0]
and partial[1]. HE_Rotate is applied to perform polyno-
mial/vector slot alignment (refer to Section 5). The swap unit
reorders each partial’s coefficients. For partial[1], inverse
NTT (INTT), decomposition, NTT, and composition units
are applied. The datapath for partial[1] splits after the INTT
computation in order to implement ciphertext decomposition.
Recall that decomposition reduces noise growth; however, the
trade-off manifests here as additional compute requirements.
Fortunately, the additional computation can be parallelized
(NTTs and SIMDmults). The decomposed polynomials are
then converted back to the evaluation domain and combined
with swapped partial[0] to produce the aligned partial that is
fed to the partial reduction network in the PE, which consists
of more SIMDadd units.
8. DESIGN SPACE EXPLORATION
This section presents design space exploration results of
our architecture. It shows that, when combined with ap-
plication optimizations, we can achieve plaintext-level HE
inference speed.
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8.1 Methodology
Design space exploration consists of sweeping different
kernel implementation parameters. Each kernel (HE_Mult,
HE_Add, and HE_Rotate–which is split into Swap, INTT,
Decompose, NTT, and Compose) is built using Catapult
HLS 10.3d [1] and synthesized with a commercially-available
40nm standard cell library targeting 400 MHz. We sweep
hundreds of design points per kernel to explore different
kernel design spaces and identify optimal implementations.
Each design is parameterized by memory bandwidth (or IO
in the case of streaming kernels), datapath parallelism (i.e.,
hardware loop unrolling), pipelining (i.e., initiation-interval),
and clock frequency. To check correctness, each kernel was
validated against equivalent SEAL implementations. We mea-
sure the power, performance, and area of these results using
the Catapult RTL generation and power estimation flows. To
estimate SRAM power and area, we use a commercial SRAM
compiler to compile each SRAM dimension used across dif-
ferent design points due to different memory tiling factors.
Based on these design sweeps, we identify the Pareto opti-
mal points and use them to identify optimal power and area
accelerator designs.
The overall performance of a full inference is modeled on a
per-layer granularity; this is because after each layer’s linear
computations, activations are sent to the client for ReLU
and Pooling. Architecturally, we assume 32K PEs and 16K
lane instances per PE to exploit the abundant application
parallelism available. Lanes per PE is swept from 4-8192.
Each layer of a DNN is expressed as a series of output neuron
computations; from this, we compute the total number of
partials per output neuron ciphertext. Given a set of hardware
resources, we execute as many in parallel as is supported and
time multiplex computation as needed for larger workloads.
The power, area, and performance estimates are derived using
lane estimates as well as additional overheads such as data
ingestion time over the I/O interface. SRAM capacities and
bandwidth are derived using HE, DNN, Kernel, Lane, and
PE parameters. SRAM is always allocated for the worst case,
supporting the maximum capacity and bandwidth necessary
to keep compute resources fully utilized.
To estimate the benefits of technology scaling, we report
power and area estimates for 5nm using foundry-reported
scaling factors. Specifically, we use 0.2× power and 0.22×
area to scale from 40nm to 16nm, based on [42, 43, 61, 63].
From 16nm to 5nm, the power and area scaling factors are
0.32× and 0.17×, using [56] and recent data from [65]. To-
gether, the power and area scaling factors (40nm to 5nm) are
0.056× and 0.038×, respectively.
8.2 Evaluation Results
This section evaluates inter-kernel and intra-kernel speed
ups to determine whether plaintext HE inference is possible.
8.2.1 Intra-Kernel Parallelism
We measure the Pareto optimal design speed ups for HE
kernels achieved by the energy-optimal point from the power-
latency Pareto frontier. An example design space Pareto
frontier for NTT is shown in Figure 10. Recall that these
frontiers are used as the cost model for the larger architecture,
whose sweeps consider the performance-latency tradeoffs of
each kernel. We normalize our speedups to the SEAL library
implementation on a 3GHz Intel SkyLake Xeon processor.
Overall, we see modest speedups of individual kernels
up to 40× speedup (average ≈10× speedup) with hardware
acceleration. The HE_Add and HE_Mult kernels provide
substantial parallelism as the underlying computation consists
of element-wise modular additions and multiplications which
can be easily parallelized. In the case of HE_Rotate (Swap,
Decompose, Compose) and NTT, parts of the underlying
computations occur sequentially while others can be paral-
lelized such as the element-wise multiplications and butterfly
computations. The key result is that intra-kernel parallelism
can reduce HE overhead by roughly one order of magnitude.
8.2.2 Inter-Kernel Parallelism
Fortunately, neural networks contain abundant application-
level parallelism that results in the majority of computation
being embarrassingly parallel. With the exception of kernel
dependencies within a Lane and the reduction of partial prod-
ucts in PEs, partials and output neurons can be executed in
parallel by allocating more hardware resources.
For example, consider CNN Layer6 in ResNet50 ( fw = 3,
w = 64, ci = co = 64). If each ciphertext contains a single
input channel (n = 4096), then all partial products can be
computed with 36,864 HE_Mult and HE_Rotate parallel
kernel invocations. The partial products for these layers can-
not be parallelized since HE_Multmust be performed before
HE_Rotate in partial-aligned scheduling. In HE_Rotate ,
domain conversion from evaluation to coefficient using INTT
must be done before polynomial decomposition, but the re-
maining NTT to convert the domain of decomposed polyno-
mials can be parallelized. As a result, we find that the degree
of parallelism that can be exploited at the Lane and PE level
is on the order of thousands for ResNet50. The key result is
that application inter-kernel parallelism can expose two to
three order of magnitude improvement.
8.2.3 Lane and PE DSE
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Table 6: Performance of running VGG16 and AlexNet on
PT-ResNet50 accelerator. Prt is partials per output CT.
Model Lat(ms) Increase PEs-Lanes Out CT µ (K)Prt µ
ResNet50 100 0% 8-512 147 50.5
VGG16 215 59% 16-256 422 595
AlexNet 77 28% 16-128 475 337
When combined, inter-kernel and intra-kernel parallelism
can bridge the remaining 9000× speedup required to achieve
plaintext inference speeds on top of Cheetah’s algorithmic
optimizations. We now identify whether the design is of
practical size and power by conducting a design space explo-
ration to run each inference model at plaintext speed. Fig-
ure 11 shows the results from the design space exploration of
ResNet50. The power-latency Pareto points identified in the
left-most subplots are the ideal architectures when designing
an accelerator tuned only for the model. The Pareto fron-
tiers provide insight into the hardware cost-per-ms tradeoff
of inference latency. The ResNet50, we find that the Pareto
optimal design point to achieve plaintext inference speeds
requires around 30W for ResNet50 and 545mm2, which is
within feasible (albeit high) resource usage for datacenter
class coprocessors. The extremely low power density is due
to aggressive SRAM tiling to meet aggressively high inter-
nal bandwidth targets for NTT units. Upon further analysis,
we find that the 128×60 bit SRAM sizes have a bit density
that is ≈ 2.5× worse than larger 1024×60 SRAMs, which
ultimately results in low power density. We also note that the
400 MHz clock target is low for a 5nm technology, furthering
reducing power density.
To understand the limitations to efficiency and performance
of each Pareto design point, Figure 11 shows the Pareto
optimal design result for ResNet50 (AlexNet, VGG16, and
MNIST exhibit similar trends). Figure 11a shows six design
points on the Pareto frontier. Figure 11b and Figure 11c show
the breakdown of run time and area respectively for these six
design points. For extreme low-latency designs (Pareto points
0 and 1), results show that most of the design area goes into
small SRAMs which are required to support the enormous
internal bandwidth required by NTT units (discussed next).
As a result, this leads to impractically large area overheads.
Overall, our results in Figure 11b confirm NTT and reduc-
tion (HE_Add) generally dominate HE accelerator compu-
tation. Recall NTT is data intensive and have many small
internal SRAMs, which at extreme design points result in
high power and area usage. This is compounded by the sheer
number of NTT units that operate in parallel, making NTT
computations the largest area component of the accelerator
overall. And even for the largest design, NTT compute re-
mains the primary latency bottleneck and IO utilization is
only at 12%. Moreover, we find that the input and output
SRAMs in the architecture do not incur as high of a power
and area cost. This means that the input duplication into each
PE to support output-stationary computation is relatively in-
expensive.
8.2.4 Accelerator Generality
Fabricating a single fixed-size accelerator for each DNN
model is impractical. Instead, the accelerator can be pro-
grammed to support different-sized networks by multiplexing
compute logic (PEs and Lanes) to handle different DNN
tensor shapes. To quantify the loss associated with the under-
utilized units and imperfect dimension matching, we quantify
the performance loss of running different ImageNet models
(AlexNet and VGG16) on the HE accelerator optimized for
ResNet50 from Figure 11 (i.e., Point 3).
The performance results are summarized in Table 6. We
find both AlexNet and VGG16 experience considerable slow-
down relative to their ideal architectures for real-time infer-
ence as seen in the Increase column of the table. This is
due to the choice of PE and Lane allocations and the dif-
ferences in layer dimensions. As the table shows, AlexNet
and VGG16 layers have a higher average number of output
CTs per layer than ResNet50, and the cost of multiplexing
PEs outweighs the cost of poor Lane utilization given the
granularity of work (a partial versus an entire output CT).
The average number of partials per ciphertext is also much
higher. However, ResNet50 is very structured given its use
of bottleneck layers many of which have partials per output
ciphertext that are divisible by or less than 512, yielding high
utilization. Conversely, VGG16’s partials per output CT tend
to fall just above or below factors of 512, (e.g., 34, 687, 1086)
resulting in lower utilization.
9. RELATED WORK
A growing interest in privacy and machine learning has re-
sulted in a body of related work on developing cryptographic
solutions. Techniques can be categorized into two groups:
HE only [11, 28, 31, 53], or multiparty computation (MPC)-
based [32, 36, 48, 49]. While each has significantly advanced
the field all suffer from either accuracy loss due approxima-
tion or high communication/computation overheads.
HE only techniques must address evaluating non-linear
functions (e.g., ReLU, MaxPool) using only available addi-
tion and multiply operations. CryptoNets [28], CryptoDL [31],
and LoLa [11] propose replacing ReLU with low-order poly-
nomials that can readily be computed with HE primitives.
However, even with square activations [11], this requires
very large HE parameters (e.g., q ≈ 1000 [28], 440 bits [11],
while Cheetah uses 60) for an appropriate noise budget. More-
over, approximate activation functions require re-training [11]
and can degrade accuracy [28]. Others propose accelerating
HE kernels with accelerators. NTT has been ported to FP-
GAs [46, 50] and GPUs [2, 3, 17] to speedup polynomial
multiplication. Raizi et al [47] propose HEAX to acceler-
ate HE kernels with FPGAs but only reports two orders of
magnitude speedup. While related, the results of HEAX are
orthogonal to the contributions of this paper; HEAX uses
CKKS (Cheetah uses BFV), focuses on ciphertext-ciphertext
multiplication (Cheetah uses plaintext-ciphertext), and mostly
targets kernel acceleration (Cheetah focus on the end-to-end
application of DNN inference and general chip architecture).
MPC-based schemes provide an alternative to approxima-
tion by combining HE with other security solutions, typically
garbled circuit (GC) [32, 36, 40, 44, 48, 49]. Among them,
Gazelle is considered the state-of-the-art [32]. Gazelle uses
HE for linear layers in the cloud and GC [64] for ReLU and
MaxPool on the client. This can significantly improve the
latency for small models but results in a severe computational
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bottleneck in deep models (e.g., ResNet50). Cheetah takes
Gazelle as a baseline and focuses on reducing the significant
computational overheads of HE.
Other work assumes different threat models with non-
cryptographic solutions. E.g., [10, 59] use TEEs to isolate
private data from untrusted software. Others have looked
at limiting information leakage by adding noise (similar to
DP) [39]; this provides increased average-case privacy with
negligible loss in accuracy.
10. CONCLUSION
This paper makes progress on fundamental roadblocks
to adoption of HE machine learning inference by propos-
ing Cheetah. First, HE-PTune automatically identifies the
HE parameter with minimal computational overhead. By
fine-grained tuning of HE parameters per each layer, HE-
PTuneâA˘Z´s parameters yield up to 11.7× performance bene-
fit over the state-of-the-art. Next, Cheetah proposes Sched-PA
which yields 10.2× speedup for dot products in FC and CNN
layers in HE. Finally, we propose a custom accelerator archi-
tecture to exploit the high application inter- and intra-kernel
parallelism. We evaluate the tradeoffs between inference
latency and hardware costs and show that combining appli-
cation level parameter tuning with specialized hardware ac-
celeration can bring HE inference down to practical plaintext
speeds.
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